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Summary 
The EU has consistently stressed the primacy of 
democracy assistance in its pronouncements on 
EU external policy, but its actions have noticeably 
lagged behind. At the heart of the problem are the 
absence of available appropriate instruments, 
incoherent external action and convoluted 
decision-making procedures that require the 
mobilisation of unanimity and the political 
backing of all 27 EU member states. The Arab 
Spring once again highlighted the EU’s inability 
to react swiftly and decisively to the 
extraordinary events unfolding in its 
neighbourhood.  
The realisation that the EU needs a less 
‘traditional’ and more rapid and flexible 
instrument for democracy assistance prompted 
reflections on the new European Endowment for 
Democracy (EED). Poland jump-started the 
process by presenting the initial draft proposal 
about a year ago. The final result of stormy 
political discussions in the meantime is soon to be 
presented in the form of a statute officially 
establishing the EED.  
In examining the process of the EED’s 
establishment, this Policy Brief arrives at three 
main conclusions. First, the initial ambitious 
proposals of the EED were diluted in the attempt 
to have all the EU member states on board. This 
resulted in the attenuation of a number of 
intended innovative aspects caused by lengthy 
political bargaining between the EU governments 
with divergent interests. Despite such an 
inclusive membership however, the EED did not 
secure all member states’ political backing.   
Secondly, having all EU member states 
represented in the Board of Governors did not 
automatically translate into tangible financial 
support for the EED. Thus far, a minority of the 
member states have made informal promises to 
provide funds, and the European Commission 
has pledged to match the amount collected. 
Thirdly, despite these setbacks, the ongoing 
discussions over a more detailed operating 
framework of the EED however offer another 
opportunity to empower the new ‘instrument’ 
with intended added value. To this end, we 
provide four recommendations for specific areas 
that are expected to be of key importance in 
making the EED a real game changer in the EU’s 
democratic assistance. 
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Who pulls the strings?  
According to the draft version of the statute, the 
EED will operate as a private foundation under 
Belgian law, which better serves the purposes of 
the instrument than the international convention 
originally proposed by Poland. The legal 
foundation of an international convention would 
require ratification of an international agreement, 
with varying procedures in each of the member 
states, which could have further delayed the 
setting up of the EED. The decision to base the 
EED headquarters in Brussels facilitates 
cooperation with the rest of the Brussels-based 
institutions and member states representations.  
The EED will operate under the strategic 
guidance and oversight of a Board of Governors 
while a more streamlined decision-making 
process will take place in the Executive 
Committee. The administrative functions will be 
handled by the Secretariat which is to be as 
compact as possible to keep the operating costs to 
a minimum. 
The Board of Governors is to consist of one 
representative from the Foreign Offices for each 
member state (plus Croatia), with each having 
one vote regardless of their financial support.1 
With no specific details on the selection criteria 
for representatives, departments working on aid, 
development and democratisation are expected to 
be given priority. The European External Action 
Service (EEAS) is to be represented by an official 
from the office of the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP). 
There is no specification as to who will represent 
the European Commission. The representative of 
the Directorate-General for Development and 
Cooperation-EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) will 
therefore be the most desirable choice in 
particular for providing specific contributions on 
the financial side and in assessing the feasibility 
of projects. 
The European Parliament is offered nine seats on 
the Board. This is important in view of securing 
political backing for the EED. There is also the 
question of which Members of the EP will become 
                                                   
1 The voting rules were the subject of the fiercest debate 
dragging on from September 2011, with some of the 
member states arguing that tying the voting rights to the 
level of financial contribution would be the main 
incentive for member states to provide funding.  
Board members. Some MEPs predominantly from 
the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) 
have already contributed to the composition of 
the EED.2 The EP can bring added value to the 
project if its representation is chosen on the 
grounds of expertise and experience and if the 
idea of non-partisan contribution is maintained.   
The decision to include representation of civil 
society, advocated by the EEAS, aims to 
strengthen the expertise capacity, but also brings 
neutrality to the external perception of the EED. 
However, the notion, as discussed, of including 
merely three representatives indicates a potential 
danger of minimising their importance vis-à-vis 
other members of the Board. The representation 
of civil society and the EU institutions could 
become particularly important in ensuring that 
the EED is perceived as neutral and distant from 
the individual national interests of the member 
states. It will also be important in case a member 
state would like to distance itself vis-à-vis a 
particular government of the targeted third 
country. 
Keeping the Board of Governors at the highest 
political level is a must in order to mobilise and 
maintain political will and support for the EED. 
Nevertheless, the current composition of the 
Board makes the EED a ‘very’ political animal 
that might create a situation where political 
discussions are dominated by nationally and 
institutionally driven interests, consequently 
making it extremely difficult to reach an 
agreement.  
The Executive Committee, which will be drawn 
from the Board of Governors, should grant a 
large amount of discretion to counterbalance the 
over-politicisation of the Board of Governors. 
This would permit the Executive Committee to 
distance itself from the particular national and 
institutional interests and instructions. It would 
therefore avoid constant and time-consuming 
politicking typical of the EU and emerge as the 
body that will provide the EED with a flexible 
and rapid decision-making. The Committee 
should be authorised to make decisions based on 
the feasibility of the proposed support and the 
                                                   
2 See “Report with a proposal for a European Parliament 
recommendation to the Council on the modalities for the 
possible establishment of a European Endowment for 
Democracy (EED)”, 2011/2245(INI) March 2012. 
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impact it could have on strengthening democracy 
in the country in question, independently of the 
priorities of a member government.  
The Executive Committee is to consist of seven 
members, headed by an Executive Director, from 
which one seat is reserved for the EP, two seats 
for the member states and the remaining three 
will be decided by the Board of Governors. These 
three seats should be allocated to the members of 
civil society balancing its underrepresentation in 
the Board of Governors as well as for the purpose 
of securing the neutrality of the decisions taken. 
All Committee members should have particular 
expertise in democracy support and assistance at 
the national or/and European level.  
Appointing the Executive Director will be another 
opportunity to strengthen the capacities of the 
EED. It would be commendable to select a person 
who already has relevant European experience 
and thus the understanding of the EU’s formal 
and informal political and inter-institutional 
dynamics. He or she should also be chosen based 
on a strong personality and a reputation for 
toughness in order to enable the EED to be pro-
active and assertive. 
On the one hand, the choice of setting up the EED 
under Belgian law might suggest that those 
involved in the process favoured granting the 
Executive Committee substantial independence in 
its decision-making, which usually is the case 
with Belgian NGOs. On the other hand, the 
criteria for representation in the Executive 
Committee are vague and the process of filling 
the positions might turn into another cycle of 
political bargaining between the EU member 
states and institutions, thus potentially limiting 
the discretion of the Executive Committee.  
Budget  
The fact that thus far the EED failed to secure 
official contributions from the majority of 
member states could be the biggest hindrance of 
the instrument. To date, only Poland and Sweden 
have informally pledged contributions of €5 
million each, and the Commission is expected to 
match that amount with funds transferred from 
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI). This sum is nowhere large 
enough to permit the EED to perform its expected 
role. There is a need for substantial contributions 
by the member states on an ongoing basis to 
make sure that the EED can operate properly.  
Moreover, the budget will be split into two parts: 
funds originating from the Commission and 
funds from the EU member states. The 
Commission’s money will be allocated under 
strict EU regulations, which ‘by definition’ limits 
the flexibility of the EED. These follows 
complicated process including but not limited to 
multi-annual programming, a lengthy and 
complex application process, registration in the 
Potential Applicant Data Online Registration 
(PADOR), reporting requirements, accountability 
rules, limitations for re-granting and the need to 
secure co-financing on the part of applicants.  
The contributions coming from the individual EU 
member states will be managed under separate 
rules in line with the rules of the accountability 
and transparency of the contributing member 
state. Most of the funding coming from member 
states, however, is more flexible and also fungible 
and thus can be mixed with other funding, while 
making it subject to ‘common’ rules established 
by the EED. These regulations should be fast, 
flexible and non-bureaucratic, with no 
requirement of co-funding from the beneficiaries.  
The most obvious approach in managing these 
two budget lines would be to use the funds 
originating from the Commission for operational 
costs of the EED and for the ‘traditional’ 
democracy assistance activities. The money 
allocated by the EU member states could be used 
for the truly high-risk and innovative projects 
that require rapid and flexible interventions.  
Mobilising additional funding 
The EED will need to mobilise funding beyond 
the member states’ and the Commission’s direct 
contributions. The money transfer from the ENPI 
to the EED’s budget is a one-time undertaking, 
providing the project with start-up capital. 
Removing the link between the voting weight of 
the member state representatives and funding 
contributions severely limits the incentive for the 
member states to fund the EED. The peer-
pressure effect can act as additional motivation, 
particularly for countries that already enjoy a 
strong reputation in democracy assistance. This 
will only be the case, however, if the EED is 
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perceived as capable of acting where other 
instruments cannot.  
The EED might need to develop a funding 
strategy by identifying various possible sources 
for securing additional money. Fundraising 
should be taken into account as one of the 
possible manners of gathering additional support. 
As illustrated by the example of donor 
conferences organised by the EU and/or member 
states, such as the recent ones for Belarus initiated 
by Poland, for Moldova led by the EU and for 
Georgia organised jointly by the Commission and 
World Bank. Such events can be successful in 
mobilising ad-hoc funds, especially for countries 
that are high on the political agenda for either 
good or bad reasons at the given time. 
Promotion of joint projects with other 
organisations, such as the US National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED), the UN and 
the Council of Europe, could increase available 
sources of funding. The EED should promote the 
pooling of resources through so-called ‘basket 
funding’. To avoid stirring up controversy over 
the nature of particular organisations, the choice 
should be made carefully each time. The EED 
should be able to identify preferable partner 
organisations in advance in order to speed up the 
process and streamline the cooperation. Once the 
EED proves its value by developing a strong and 
uncontroversial brand, it will become easier to 
mobilise additional funding. 
Funding criteria 
Setting clear yet flexible criteria for funding will 
be a challenging task. On the one hand, detailed 
criteria could limit the possibility of the decision-
making becoming a subject of nationally or 
institutionally-driven policy agendas. Working 
rules can be established to minimise in particular 
ongoing debates between the member states on 
prioritising the Eastern vs. the Southern 
Neighbourhood as well as the institutional ‘turf 
battles’ between the EEAS, the Commission and 
the EP. On the other hand, setting the funding 
criteria too narrowly could undermine the 
flexibility of the EED. Therefore, establishing a 
general framework for funding criteria could 
result in agreeing on a minimum common 
denominator without undermining the flexibility 
of the instrument. 
The identification of the beneficiaries in the draft 
version of the statute has been kept rather 
general, with the EED supporting pro-democratic 
movements and activists. This indicates a flexible 
approach towards identifying potential grant 
recipients that could trigger and lead the 
democratic transition. The flexibility of the EED is 
also maintained in the fact that it will allocate 
funding without prior consent of local authorities 
and governments. 
Transparency and accountability  
The highly sensitive circumstances in which the 
EED will operate will pose a particular challenge 
to ensure a correct balance between achieving 
transparency and accountability while not 
compromising the confidentiality and safety of 
supported individuals and organisations.  
On the one hand, the proposed two-stage 
assessment system with reports being produced 
by the both Executive Director and the externally 
delegated audit will ensure sufficient 
transparency and accountability of the EED. 
These will assess the effectiveness of the 
programme in light of the motives behind the 
decisions taken.  On the other hand, the EED will 
need to be prepared to deviate from its ‘regular’ 
accountability rules in some cases in order to 
provide discrete support where it is necessary. 
This creates additional incentive of committing to 
the accountability standards internally among the 
member states, institutions and civil society 
groups involved in EED’s decision making, rather 
than being imposed externally.  
Creating synergies 
Ensuring a cooperative relationship between 
actors working in the field of democracy support 
is a must in order to make sure that the creation 
of the EED does not stimulate further wasteful 
competition over already limited funding in this 
area. Particularly in the current climate of 
financial austerity, the presence of various actors 
taking part in democracy assistance should be 
seen as an asset, not as a rivalry for the same 
source of funding. Therefore, it is necessary to set 
up general guidelines for developing cooperation 
between the EED and other actors operating in 
this field so the joint effort multiplies individual 
resources and capacities.  
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In addition, emphasis should be placed on a 
possibility of promoting regional projects. As 
seen in the case of the Arab Spring, other regions 
too can undergo similar transitions. The EED can 
advocate closer cooperation between countries by 
supporting exchange of experience and good 
practices. Moreover, through facilitating a peer-
pressure where possible, the EED could aim to 
reinforce commitments of targeted countries to 
democratic values. 
Building up the expertise capacity 
There is no one model of democracy and thus 
there is no single policy of democracy assistance. 
Moreover, with the composition of the Executive 
Committee changing on a regular basis, there is a 
need to institutionalise the internal development 
of knowledge and expertise into a set of working 
procedures and an internal handbook on the 
implementation to streamline the decision-
making process. This is expected to be largely a 
process of ‘learning by doing’. 
Since the EED will not operate through the 
network of local offices, at least in the early stages 
of its existence, and with no representation in 
targeted countries, the Secretariat General should 
become a centre for coordinating information 
management from various sources. Those 
recruited to work in the EED should not be 
generalists but rather specialists on the targeted 
regions and countries.  
Furthermore, the EED will need to make use of 
existing expertise in the EP, the Commission, the 
EEAS and EU Delegations as well as in the EU 
member state capitals and diplomatic 
representations. 
Promoted particularly by the EEAS and the EP, 
civil society groups have already managed to 
leave their footprint on the EED’s modalities 
during numerous conferences, consultations and 
interventions in the EP’s Committee of Foreign 
Affairs (AFET). The expertise of these groups in 
managing democracy assistance, which is 
generally perceived as efficient and effective, 
should be further sought by the EED.   
Developing inclusive political stage  
On the one hand, the EED’s funding will be used 
in high-risk environments. It will be tempting to 
select and target countries already in the spotlight 
and/or those showing more promise as the EU’s 
assistance would be more visible. On the other 
hand, support for the countries not experiencing 
major shake-ups might prove to be less 
spectacular but equally necessary to ensure the 
ability of the democratic groups to trigger a 
change in the future. Consequently, the EED 
should be employed in both pre-transition and 
transition stages and maintained until other EU 
instruments are activated in order to provide 
sustainable support.  
The EED must moreover provide funding for 
governments, local authorities and parliaments 
willing to reform and embark on democratic 
transformation. Consequently, the EED should 
welcome all possible stakeholders in the targeted 
country and equip them to take part in the 
political process and democratic transformation. 
Only the broadest possible political dialogue can 
produce sustainable democracy. This might be 
particularly difficult in the regions and countries 
where the transition is followed by conflicts. In 
such cases, the EED’s activities would have to be 
accompanied by extensive reconciliation process.  
It will be important to find a compromise 
between supporting big and thus usually better 
organised groups with a proven record and 
grassroots organisations often perceived as 
marginal and ineffective. In order to engage 
underdeveloped organisations, there should be 
no requirements for co-financing and the 
application process should be straightforward. 
The EED’s support should aim at strengthening 
the capacity of these organisations. The renewal 
of-grants without restrictions imposed on the 
number of times renewal can be requested is 
usually the most flexible form of funding and 
thus the EED should include this option.  
The EED should support actors who are 
underrepresented on the local political stage and 
have limited administrative or other capacities. 
Such actors are not able to play a meaningful role 
on their own and are also not capable of applying 
for EU funding due to a lack of human and 
financial resources. Depending on the local 
context, such vulnerable groups are often women, 
youth and minorities, but also opposition parties. 
The EED should be cautious not to follow the lists 
of ‘usual suspects’, which is often the case with 
the EU Delegations, instead aiming for inclusion 
of diverse participation. 
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Supporting local ownership 
For decades, a major criticism of the EU’s 
engagement in the neighbourhood has been its 
insufficient attention to the needs of the partner 
countries and pursuing its own agenda. This led 
to the situation where many the organisations, 
notably in the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership, have pursued the priorities specified 
by the EU funding programmes but not 
necessarily those corresponding to their needs in 
advancing democratic standards.  
The EED must aim to facilitate a favourable 
environment for the local communities to make 
decisions on their own terms. Inadequate 
involvement of representatives of partner 
countries at the programming level of the EU’s 
financial instruments and insufficient 
consideration paid to expertise of the local society 
have often led to the situation where the EU’s 
implementation of democracy assistance is 
detached from the local context. It is therefore 
crucial for the EED to involve democratic 
representatives of the targeted countries in the 
discussions at the earliest possible stage to ensure 
that the design of the support is the most 
appropriate. Such demand-driven support 
focusing on particular needs of the country could 
promote local involvement and thus strengthen 
local ownership of the democratisation process. 
Since the EED will operate globally, it will have to 
deal with diverse communities with different 
political, cultural and religious sensitivities 
requiring adoption of an individual approach in 
each case. Such country-specific strategies should 
be based on an impact assessment with reference 
to the decision whether or not to grant the 
support, but also to the nature of the provided 
support. The need for an informed decision, 
based on diversely gathered information and 
impact assessment analyses, in combination with 
the urgency for immediate action would have to 
be incorporated into developing a smart and fast 
track approach. 
Ensuring coherent action 
The addition of a new instrument to the EU’s 
existing diverse portfolio for democracy 
promotion increases the need for vertical, inter-
institutional, horizontal and external coherence. 
Avoiding duplication across various levels 
becomes even more challenging. The need for a 
comprehensive framework for EU democracy 
promotion becomes even more pressing. Such an 
overarching strategy will strengthen the 
efficiency and coordination between the EU’s 
geographical and thematic programmes. 
By acting on the basis of a fast and flexible 
approach, the EED’s support is often expected to 
be ad hoc and fragmented. Therefore, it is 
necessary to integrate it into a wider strategy 
linked to the other instruments in general and the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) in particular with the aim of 
creating a coherent action framework for 
subsequent stages of democratic transformation. 
Specifically, the EED could become an instrument 
for funding projects that would not qualify under 
other EU instruments. Instruments and 
programmes such as the EIDHR,3 the Instrument 
of Stability, the Civil Society Facility and the Non-
State Actors and Local Authorities programme 
should be scrutinised to identify the gaps.  
The principle of complementarity should be 
upheld in all aspects of the EED’s operations.4 
Close cooperation between the EED, the EEAS, 
the Commission and the member states is the key 
to ensuring a coherent and sustainable 
framework of support. The role of the EEAS and 
the Commission will be crucial in order to 
provide the EED’s decision-makers with 
knowledge on how the other EU instruments 
work and thus plan how the support should be 
continued at the later stage.  
EU delegations in the targeted countries could 
serve as a primary source of information on the 
situation on the ground and advice on what 
works best in a particular context. Their input 
should be used by the EEAS and DG DEVCO for 
drafting short and medium-term impact analyses 
that should serve as a basis for making decisions 
and granting support. Subsequently they should 
be incorporated in the comprehensive and longer-
term action plans producing a coherent response 
                                                   
3 The EIDHR, for example, has been criticised for not 
giving enough support to non-registered beneficiaries.  
4 Nevertheless, the EED is not responsible for providing 
the complementarity of the strategies. This is a task for 
the HRVP, the EEAS and the Commission, but the EED 
can exert additional pressure. 
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towards developing sustainable democracy in a 
given country.  
Finally, the cooperation with other international 
and multilateral organisations, as well as 
individual member states present on the ground 
will help avoid duplication of effort. EU 
Delegations should be also helpful in identifying 
other potential sources of funding and partner 
organisations interested in teaming up for joint 
projects. The key challenge would be to design an 
information-sharing procedure which would 
enable for fast exchanges between all actors and 
to ensure confidentiality of often highly sensitive 
information.  
Making a difference 
EU’s democracy assistance, as seen particularly 
on the example of the southern neighbourhood, 
has an ambiguous tradition of democracy efforts 
often being a hostage to political and security 
concerns or/and economic opportunities. 
Therefore, with the paradigm shift in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards 
the “more for more” concept, requiring evidence 
of achievement as a precondition for receiving 
more funding, the EU can no longer avoid firmly 
stating the primacy of supporting democratic 
aspirations in third countries. The European 
Consensus on Democracy should be finally 
agreed on, adopted and implemented. The ENP 
concept of ‘deep and sustainable democracy’, 
contained in the declaration on the establishment 
of the EED,5 can be used as a starting point 
towards elaborating what kind of democracy the 
EU wants to promote. This would subsequently 
allow for identifying possible dimensions of 
democracy assistance and concrete actions that 
should be supported. 
The existence of active political parties is a 
defining measure for an inclusive political 
environment. The direct funding for political 
parties by the EED is expected to meet resistance 
by a number of member states. This is one of the 
areas where the EED’s initial value could be lost 
in due course of political bargaining. The example 
of the EIDHR support given for political parties 
via political foundations has proved to work well 
                                                   
5 See ”Declaration on Establishing the European 
Endowment for Democracy, 18764/11, Council of the 
European Union”, 20 December 2011.  
and without creating contentious implications for 
EU’s support. Therefore, one of the options could 
be to use political foundations as a point of 
indirect transfer of funding. However, with 
growing operational confidence, the EED should 
be allowed to directly support the political parties 
based on the principle of non-partisan 
engagement on an ad-hoc basis. This would 
require guidelines and good practices on what 
works best in particular situations. Thus, by 
building on the experience of other organisations, 
the NED and political foundations in particular, 
the EED should be able to judge whether it is 
more effective and appropriate to provide 
indirect or direct funding, depending on the 
circumstances. 
The EED should not become a substitute for a 
firmer and more political support of the EU in its 
democracy assistance in and of itself. Its 
implementation of practical measures should be 
accompanied by activities of the relevant 
European institutions as well as member states, of 
course, where this is possible and does not 
compromise the need to ensure discrete or/and 
neutral engagement.  
The EED should gradually stretch geographically 
in terms of support and membership including 
but not limited to countries of the EFTA and the 
candidate countries. In the short term, the EED 
could contribute to the development of the EU 
delegations by helping them to become local hubs 
of democracy assistance for other organisations. 
In the medium term, the EED could develop its 
own regional offices. 
Ultimately, the EED could contribute to a vastly 
improved implementation of the EU’s democracy 
assistance, which has particularly been seen as its 
weakest link. Adoption of a more flexible and 
‘fast-track’ path of assessing needs and 
immediate granting of money could deliver 
almost immediate tangible results. The EED 
needs therefore to become an instrument free of 
nationally-driven decisions, European ‘turf wars’ 
and cumbersome bureaucracy. The Endowment 
can and should take on the challenge of making 
the EU a truly committed, pro-active and effective 
leader of democracy assistance.  
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Recommendations 
1. The EED will need a strong political backing in 
particular from the EU member states. However, 
the ‘checks and balances’ within the decision-
making process of the EED should be insured. To 
this end, striking the right balance between the 
roles of the Board of Governors and the Executive 
Committee as well as strong presence of civil 
society to transcend member states’ narrow 
political concerns is of key importance. Inclusion 
of civil society will additionally enrich the EED 
with their practical experience.  
2. The decision-making process within the EED 
should be smart, fast and flexible for the use of 
the funds originating from the EU member states. 
The EED should aim for a budget that is 
comparable to that of the US National 
Endowment for Democracy or of some EU 
member states’ foundations in order to be capable 
of properly implementing its ambitious agenda. 
 
 
3. Leadership in democracy assistance requires a 
capacity for real risk-taking, which the EU has 
lacked so far. As opposed to the ‘more for more’ 
principle, which has become the backbone of the 
ENP, the EED should follow a ‘more for less’ 
rationale for intervening in countries where 
efforts at democratic reform are still deeply 
constrained. This new approach will require 
‘learning by doing’ exercises while regular impact 
assessments should aim to minimise possibility of 
failure. Fear of failure, however, should no longer 
be allowed to inhibit the EU’s support for 
democracy. 
4. The Board of Governors, the Executive 
Committee as well as the staff of the EED should 
be composed of specialists who are capable of 
tabling substantive proposals and innovative 
methods. Those involved in the EED should 
refrain from turning it into a platform for 
constant politicking and the defence of narrow 
national interests.  
